2011年12月25日 星期日
進德智所拙，退耕力不任。
The Origin of Morality
Introduction
From the Latin moralitas, it means manner, proper behavior. And we know that a moral code is a system of morality. But how do we come up with our morality? What’s the origin of morality? This article tries to answer this question by comparing three different versions to the question: Darwin’s theory of natural selection, the state of nature by T. Hobbes, the origin of Li by Xunzi.
Three different answers have their advantages and disadvantages: Darwin’s theory of natural select is supported by fossil evidence; it’s probably the most convincing answer to the origin of moral sense. But how do we come up with moral code (etc. “Thou shalt not kill”)? Facing the gap between moral feeling and a system of morality, Darwin has an explanation, but the explanation is rather inconvincible to me.
Compares to Darwin’s theory, Hobbes’ theory of social contract standing from a mechanistic understanding of human beings, demonstrated what life would be without government. The kind of life is so called state of nature. State of nature might be rather convincing in the first sight. But under the understanding of human beings of Hobbes, (that is: all people are selfish) we find it hard to explain the special feeling when we conduct moral action or praise others’ morally good action. In other words, we don’t help people or praise others out of self-benefit reasons, it’s more than that. Hobbes’ theory may explain the origin of government, but not morality.
Xunzi was a Chinese philosopher who lived earlier than Darwin and Hobbes about 2000 years, but his theory of Li, which means moral code in Chinese, is much more plausible. Xunzi’s approach is similar to Hobbes. He demonstrated another version of state of nature, but his understanding of human beings is quite different. Xunzi considered the nature of human beings as a combination of good desire and bad desire[1]. In the discussion of the period of three years' mourning for parents[2], we can see that a more complete understanding of human nature plays an important role in Xunzi’s theory of Li.
In the following paragraphs, I’ll at first consider Darwin’s theory of natural select and the Hobbes’ theory of social theory. After pointing out the difficulties each other are facing with, I’ll try to solute the problems by raising Xunzi’s theory of Li.
Darwin’s Version
According to R. J. Joyce (1995: 254; 1999: 142-143), the evolutionary process of moral sense described by Darwin could be demonstrated in 4 stages:
1. After the evolution of some social instincts that are strong enough, ancient people started to gather as communities.
a. These social instincts are probably the extension of feelings between children and parents.
b. These feelings between children and parents are the results of the process of natural select, and its extension, social instincts, are the result of natural select too. When living together became a better way to survive, animals lived this way got an advantage over its competitors.
c. Between all these social instincts, the sympathetic feeling is especially important. This feeling made animals help their companion when they were suffering.
2. Once the members of community exhibited enough mental ability, these social instincts may still overcome by other self-interest impulses, but the members were able to remind of the insufficient instinct. In Darwin’s opinion, this is the origin of conscience.
3. The development of language made it much easier to communicate with each other. What is more, they expressed these social instincts into a set of rules in ordinary living.
4. Members of community formed the habit of considering the evaluation by other members whenever they take actions. And the estimation of action and evaluation requires certain level of experiences and rationality. Once the members of community formed the habit, they passed it to their children.
Darwin’s theory is supported by fossil evidences. It seems very convincing when it comes to our feeling toward family, the sympathetic feeling to others. But, is it true that the moral code in our ordinary life just an expression from our inside feelings? A simple fact could easily dispute the link from stage 2 to stage 3: the so called moral code, the expression of our natural needs in Darwin’s theory, is obvious a restriction to our action. Facing the breaker to our social life, we put them in jail; make them pay for their misbehaviors. Why? If moral codes just the expression of our inside feelings, why the punishment? Obviously, if moral codes are the expression of our inside feelings as Darwin claimed, we can naturally expect that the conscience itself will do the punish job, we would not need polices, jails, even governments. But there are still crimes and polices and jails. Take another example; we educate our children not to lie, not to hurt others, usually by means of punishment or reward. If we have to educate our moral code to our children by resorting to one’s self-interest disposition of running away from punishment and getting reward, how could we still clam that our morality is just the expression of our inside feelings?
This doubt was at first raised by Xunzi. In the question of an earlier philosopher which asserted that people are naturally good inside, Mencius, he written “Is that true the nature of human beings are naturally good? If so, why do we still need good king and morality?[3]” The same difficulty is still unsolved in Darwin’s theory. In fact, our self-interest disposition is much more decisive than our social instincts; what’s more, the former might be the sine qua non of the latter. But I do not want to argue that strong here; rather, what I’m suggesting is that the feeling of sympathy or any other social instincts could not individually be the origin of morality. It’s obviously not enough and conflict to our ordinary intuitio.
Hobbes’ Version[4]
Unlike Darwin’s theory, T. Hobbes gave a quite different version. The state of nature concludes few important propositions:
1. People are approximately equal.
2. Under the condition of limited resource, people must compete to survive.[5]
Under the state of nature, there’re no moral codes or any kinds of rules. People fight for themselves to survive. Signing contract is the only way out. And in order to make sure the execution of the laws and punishment, people transfer their natural rights to a king. This is the description of moral codes of Thomas Hobbes.
There are two major differents between Hobbes’ theory and Darwin’s: 1. state of nature established completely under the understanding of human beings that people are basically self-interest. Important terms in Darwin’s theory, such as social instincts or sympathetic feeling are totally invisible in the explanation of moral codes. 2. To Hobbes, the appearance of a system of morality is a historical stage; but in Darwin’s theory, it’s rooted in our nature.
Now, let us consider these two explanations to the origin of morality given by Hobbes and Darwin. Which one is more plausible? In the last paragraph, I’ve already pointed the problem of Darwin’s version out. Yes, the argument raised by Darwin is good but still not convincing enough. Hobbes’ theory based on a whole different viewpoint of the nature of human beings: people are self-interest. It seemed like a more plausible understanding of human nature, but is that true that this assumption raised by Hobbes could perfectly verified the occurrence of moral codes? In Leviathan, Hobbes told us that the rules we’ve been followed, such as “Thou shalt not kill”, is totally based on our consideration toward self-preservation. The reason why we help elderly is the same reason we work hard to make ends meets; we’re all doing these for self-interest reasons. But is that true? Is that true that we don’t break rules just because we’re afraid of being punished? I think Hobbes theoretically, because of his mechanical understanding toward human beings, ignored the special feelings that push us to conduct action that is morally good. We don’t help each other always out of self-interest considerations. Even though the self-interest disposition inside our nature plays an important role toward our ordinary living, but itself alone could not explain the morality. Otherwise it would be strange to understand the occurrence of our sympathetic feelings when we conduct actions that are morally good.
If it has to, there are only two possible solutions: 1. actions out of sympathetic reasons are accidently coincide with the moral code which is based on our need of self-preservation; 2. All of our social instincts could be reduced to one kind of self-interest disposition.
The first is too strange to understand. We can hardly imagine that two extremely different instincts could be so fanatically fit in. The second might be a strong view in modern discussion in evolutionary ethics, but not for Hobbes’ theory. In the mechanical picture of human beings in Hobbes, there is no room for such feeling. If so, there wouldn’t be state of nature and the conclusion about government Hobbes made.
If my consideration above is approximately correct, we can conclude that these two different understanding of human nature could not convincingly explain the origin of morality. Is there another approach? In the next paragraph, I’ll try to answer this question by raising Xunzi’s theory of Li.
Xunzi’s Version
Xunzi is known for his assertion that people are naturally evil. His approach which justifies his political proposition is extremely similar to Hobbes’. He demonstrated another kind state of nature and built his following inferences on it. But what’s the different between Hobbes and Xunzi? At first, we must clarify one longstanding misunderstanding toward his assertion of human nature:
Whenever we used the adjective “good”, we’re always referring that something is well-govern; similarly, whenever we used “bad”, we’re always referring that something is nasty, brutish and poor.[6]
According to this text, when he asserts that human nature is bad or evil, that does not imply that people are self-interest. What Xunzi really means is that if we indulge our nature, our living condition will be nasty, brutish and poor. After pointing this major different between Xunzi and Hobbes, I will introduce main points in Xunzi’s theory in the rest part of the article:
What’s the origin of morality? I answer: People desire by nature. When people desire, people pursue things. When there’s no restriction for the pursuit, people fight for their desires. When there has fights, living becomes brutish. When living becomes brutish, people become poor. Ancient Kings disliked such living condition, so they create morality to content people’s desires by distribution. Making desires content and resources well-distributed, that’s the origin of morality. Thus, morality is also purveyance.[7]
Since people have been well- provided, moral men seek for the proper distinction between each other. What’s the proper distinction between each other? I answer: distinction between who is good and bad; distinction between who is elder and young; distinction between who is important in society and who is rather not. The proper distinction is that all people be what they should be.[8]
In the first section, we may discover the similarities between Xunzi and Hobbes; they both set out a living condition which has no rules at all. But in the second, apparently Xunzi did not consider self-interest needs as the only content that morality possesses. Besides basic needs for survival, the proper distinction between each other is also important. But what’s the proper distinction?
Animals have the fact of father and son, but there’s no relationship between them; animals have the fact of male and female, but there’s no distinction between them. Thus, humanity is no more than differentiation; differentiation is no more than distinction; distinction is no more than morality; morality is no more than a great king.[9]
We can approximately define the proper distinction as different relations in our society, including parents and children; men and women. These are two major parts in Xunzi’s theory of morality: making the society well-governed and properly guide impulses inside us. Making the society well-governed is the most basic requirement; after that, we want all our inside social instincts to be content. And to Confucians these feelings or social instincts, similar to Darwin’s theory, is majorly extended from our feelings toward family:
Why do we conduct the period of 3 year’s mourning? I answer: our morality is corresponding to our feelings. This polishes our society; helps us to distinct differents between familiar and aloof. Thus, it could not be easily changed. [10]
The period of 3 year’s mourning was the actual convention at that time. Xunzi reconsidered the existent of it and explicitly showed that morality must take care of our social instincts.
The so called morality has to rise up which is not enough; to restrict which is too much. Morality has to properly guide people to respect and love in manner and help them complete the beautifulness of right behavior. [11]
The meaning of guiding people’s inside impulses is clear now. Morality could properly restrict actions out of self-interest reasons and help people to complete their social instincts inside also. In Xunzi’s understanding of human nature, of course the self-interest part is decisive, but we still have social instincts just as Darwin assert. Morality has to take care both of this, otherwise the society won’t be well-governed as Xunzi hoped.
After the introduction above, we may reconstruct Xunzi’s explanation to the origin of morality:
1. Besides the intense disposition of self-interest, human beings also possess certain social instincts.[12]
2. Before the morality is created, people fight for their desires. Living condition is nasty and poor.
3. The leader or clever people in ancient tribes see the possibility of a well-governed society. So they create a system of morality to distribute limited resources and properly guide the inside impulses of human beings.
This argument may seem indelicate, but it might be the most plausible one in three different versions this article talk about. Consider the unsolved gap between moral feelings and a system of morality that Darwin’s theory is facing with, Xunzi apparently indicated that the self-interest part in the nature of human beings is definitely more decisive. Surely he wouldn’t assert that social instincts would alone complete the appearance of morality. But Xunzi did not thus ignore the social instincts rooted in our mind; on the contrary, contenting these instincts is an important effect of morality. His theory could explain the special feeling inside us when we praise others or conduct actions that are morally good.
Xunzi’s understanding of the nature of human beings is definitely more complete than other two. But the most clever point is the concept “great king“. We know that in Xunzi’s political theory, the power of rationality is extremely important. The leader or few clever people in the community could discover the possibility of a better way of social life through the consideration of rationality. And if a system of morality is not totally derived from the nature of human beings, such moral code could be understood as a set of clever rules that helps our society becomes better. The concept “great king” creates an indirect inferential relation between the nature of human beings and moral codes. This indirect inferential relation makes Xunzi’s theory possess the advantages of other two, and escape the corresponding problems.
Conclusion
What’s the modern meaning of this kind of comparison? What then after knowing that Xunzi’s theory could explain the origin of morality more convincing? The question is hard to answer. But I do think this kind of consideration is related to the growing of evolutionary ethics and game theory of morality. Xunzi’s theory provides us a different view of politics: a conventional Chinese view that believes everything has its best condition, human society included.[13] I think it’s a workable but still unexplored area, and I hope that this article could bring out more discussion to this area.
Reference
1. Joyce, R. J. (2006). The Evolution of Morality. The MIT Press.
2. Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan. London: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd, 1914.
3. 王先謙，《荀子集解》，藝文印書館，民66。
4. 陳正雄，《荀子政治思想研究》，文津出版社，民72。
5. 熊公哲，《荀子今註今譯》，臺北商務印書館，，民64。
[1] 「故情貌之變，足以別吉凶。」。王先謙，《荀子集解》，〈禮論〉。
[2] 「三年之喪。」。王先謙，《荀子集解》，〈禮論〉。
[3]「今誠以人之性故正理平治邪？則惡用聖王、惡用禮義哉。」王先謙，《荀子集解》，〈性惡〉。
[4] This comparison might cause the misunderstanding that these two are conflict to each other. But they are not. They are rather two different theories of different approaches.
[6] 「凡古今天下之所謂善者，正理平治也；所謂惡者，偏險悖亂也，是善惡之分也已。」王先謙，《荀子集解》，〈性惡〉。
[7] 「禮起於於何也？……故禮者養也。」
[8] 「君子既得其養，又好其別，易謂別？曰：貴賤有等，長幼有差，貧富輕重皆有稱者也。」王先謙，《荀子集解》，〈禮論〉。
[9] 「夫禽獸有父子，而無父子之親；有牝牡而無男女之別。故人道莫不有辨。辨莫大於分，分莫大於禮，禮莫大於聖王。」王先謙，《荀子集解》，〈非相〉。
[10] 「三年之喪，何也？曰：稱情而立文，因以飾群，別親疏貴賤之節，而不可益損也。」王先謙，《荀子集解》，〈禮論〉。
[11]「禮者，斷長續短，損有餘，益不足，達愛敬之文，而滋成行義之美者也。」王先謙，《荀子集解》，〈禮論〉。
[12] To Xunzi, it’s a given fact which we have no ability to change. So he did not explain the origin of moral sense as Darwin did.
[13] The ideal condition of human society is ”太一” in Xunzi’s term.
2011年12月24日 星期六
Married with children
There's no need for you to say you're sorry
Goodbye I'm going home
I don't care no more so don't you worry
Goodbye I'm going home
I hate the way that even though you
Know you're wrong you say you're right
I hate the books you read and all your friends
Your music's shitty it keeps me up all night
There's no need for you to say you're sorry
Goodbye I'm going home
I don't care no more so don't you worry
Goodbye I'm going home
I hate the way that you are so sarcastic
And you're not very bright
You think that everything you've done's fantastic
Your music's shitty it keeps me up all night
And it will be nice to be alone
For a week or two
But I know that I will be
Right back here with you
There's no need for you to say you're sorry
Goodbye I'm going home
I don't care no more so don't you worry
Goodbye I'm going home
I hate the way that even though you
Know you're wrong you say you're right
I hate the books you read and all your friends
Your music's shitty it keeps me up all night
2011年12月22日 星期四
冬至
原本想說些什麼的，像是今年發生了什麼事等等。可是又有點沒有頭緒。
今年的年初，一直到五六月吧，我過得像是在夢中一樣。很開心、平靜，遠離一切事物，五月之後表面是沒什麼改變，不過我倒是發現了自己脆弱的可怕。
妳相信嗎？一個人會為了他早就知道不值得的事物奮不顧身。我想那是因為我們基因被種下種子的緣故，所以總是用盡一切方法想引起別人注意。
所以我又把自己搞的一團糟了，這次...該怎麼說呢？我其實不想講些什麼，我只能說：一個巴掌拍不響。是的，這不是誰的問題，只是兩個這樣的人就發生這樣的事了。有什麼誤解什麼難聽的話，雨都下了一個月了。
然後到現在，我也被狠很地罵了一頓，用詞之難聽，我還是第一次聽過。不過我又能怎麼樣呢？只是心一直平靜不下來，掯有個人恨我耶，有個人恨我......這簡單的一句話比想像中沈重多了。有時候我想起來，有股衝動想撥電話過去痛罵一頓。那有什麼用呢？我會得到什麼嗎？我真希望自己能夠真正無所期待。
還有未來。沒錯，該死的未來。我對於讀哲學這回事一直都沒有什麼多大的想法，對哲學倒是有一些。我今天背了了一句話，在荀子天論篇裡頭的......我有點忘了。不過荀子的大意就是：那些光怪陸離的事，沒有急迫的需要就別鳥了吧！夫婦之別、父子之親、仁義善惡，才該是討論的。
十一月底，我因為寫了一篇光怪陸離的報告，被打了很糟糕的分數。我有點不爽，跑去找老師理論。老師請我吃了晚餐，我們聊了很久。這是我很久以來第一次放縱自己大放厥詞。老師和我說，你對於自己想要走哪條路，必須開始思考，讓它成為你在思考的一件事。有天晚上，我因為一件學問上的事情和某個極端聰明、準備出國的學長聊起來，他告訴我，從現在開始準備GRE吧。
我不知道該回應些什麼。其實我只是覺得這很好玩，讀些理論，讀些古書，有時候會很開心，覺得學到了很多東西。其實我不想當個學者，不想出國和別人競爭，我只是想靜靜地看書，偶爾有些心得，這樣就很好了。我說不出口，笑笑而已。
其實我該問自己的是，那你想幹嘛呢？老實說我一直在思考這個問題，裴憨作我的證人，大概好幾年了，從高中開始。
可是還是一點屁都沒有。
還是不免俗的來說一些新年新希望好了。
首先，希望能好好省錢；還有，希望能努力一點唸書；能夠無所期待。
另外，我可能會想做的工作：哲學教學。不過我希望是國高中生，我希望在他們面對人生的種種問題時，能夠告訴他們，其實很多人都想過類似的問題並且嘗試提出解答。說不定妳會被他們說服。我就被說服了，所以我才在這裡。
然後，就是，當一個各方面都自足的人。我想這才是最重要的。